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A Critical Take on Shasta County
and the "New Chicago School"
Douglas Litowitz*
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship is abuzz with research on social norms-nonlegal
rules of behavior that are enforced by private individuals through social
sanctions such as gossip and ostracism.' Upon a moment's reflection it is
easy to see that social norms affect virtually all of our behavior, from
mundane matters of personal hygiene to practical matters, including
business negotiations and dispute resolution.2 In addition to affecting our
behavior, social norms tend to become internalized as standards of self-
assessment, which means that our thoughts are equally affected by social
norms. Until the last decade or so legal scholars devoted little attention to
social norms, holding fast to the longstanding assumption (among legal
theorists) that law is the dominant constraint on human behavior. Recent
scholarship casts doubt on this assumption of "legal centrism"3 by
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University.
1. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV.
1781, 1781 (2000) ("Scholarship on the relationship between law and social norms, between legal and
nonlegal sanctions, is flourishing, and there is no sign that it will abate any time soon."). See generally
Symposium, Commentaries on Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 327 (2002);
Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Symposium, Norms, Law,
and Order in the City, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 129 (2000); Conference, Social Norms, Social Meaning,
and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Symposium, The Legal
Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000).
2. Richard Posner provides a concise definition of a "social norm": "A social norm ('norm' for
short) is a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or legislature, nor
enforced by threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with (otherwise it wouldn't be a rule).
The rules of etiquette, including norms of proper dress and table manners; the rules of grammar;
standard business practices; and customary law in prepolitical societies and private associations are all
examples of social norms." See RICHARD POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 288 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Against Legal Centrism, 81 CAL. L. REV. 417 (1993) (reviewing
ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991)); see also
Oliver Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 520 (1983) (using the term "legal centralism" to describe the view that governments are the
chief source of rules for conduct, thereby ignoring non-governmental constraints on behavior and
thought). Historically, legal centrism can be traced at least as far back as Thomas Hobbes's claim that
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pointing out that social norms have a more profound affect on our lives
than law, at least if we understand law in the narrow sense of formal rules
backed by the state's coercive power. In fact, empirical research suggests
that many people (perhaps most people) lack a working knowledge of law
and instead find themselves "opting out" of the legal system by resolving
disputes according to social norms.4 Within the legal academy there is a
growing body of research on social norms (some might say that it has
become almost a cottage industry), and in this paper I want to raise some
questions about the fundamental orientation of this scholarship.
To begin with, it is somewhat surprising that the dominant scholarship
on social norms has emerged from a group of thinkers affiliated in varying
degrees with the law and economics movement. In particular, recent
scholarship on social norms is associated with members of the so-called
"New Chicago School,"5 a group of young scholars from elite schools who
came to notoriety after their work on social norms was profiled in a 1997
feature article in The New Yorker.6 Members of the New Chicago School
make clear that their work on social norms continues the tradition of
scholarship beginning with the groundbreaking work of professor Robert
Ellickson of Yale Law School, whose 1991 book, Order Without Law,7
earned high praise for its detailed portrayal of social norms among farmers
and ranchers in Shasta County, California. It is no exaggeration to say that
Ellickson's book is the founding document of the New Chicago School
and the starting point for all recent work on social norms.8 Ellickson's
central message, based on extensive fieldwork, is that people tend to
a centralized Leviathan is the only way to deliver men from the chaotic state of nature to an ordered
social world--to put the point differently, that there can be no true order without law.
4. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
5. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998). The "Chicago"
in the term "New Chicago School" comes from the fact that most of the scholars in the burgeoning
movement were based at the University of Chicago Law School. The term "New" is meant to
distinguish the movement from what might be called the "Old Chicago School," namely the law and
economics movement that began with the seminal work of University of Chicago economist Ronald
Coase and found expression in the works of University of Chicago Professors Richard Posner, Frank
Easterbrook, and Richard Epstein. See Interdisciplinary Program Series Transcript, The New Chicago
School: Myth or Reality?, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1998) (transcribing a roundtable dialogue
on the New Chicago School moderated by Richard Epstein, who referred to himself as a member of
the "old law and economics" and to the New Chicago School as the "new law and economics")
[hereinafter Transcript, The New Chicago School].
6. Jeffrey Rosen, The Social Police, NEW YORKER, Oct. 20 & 27, 1997, at 170.
7. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
8. The new norms scholars describe Order Without Law as "brilliant," see Lessig, supra note 5 at
665, and they feel that Ellickson's book "created, or at least anticipated, a burgeoning new subfield of
legal studies." See Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 344 (1998). Overall, there is general agreement that "the recent interest in norms and law
almost certainly dates from Bob Ellickson's important work on Shasta County." See Randal Picker,
Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1225, 1286 (1997). Even those who are critical of Ellickson's approach are quick to recognize
the central impact of his book. See Lawrence Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J.
177, 236 (1999) (referring to Order Without Law as the "ur-text of the norms school").
[Vol. 15:295
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resolve disputes informally without invoking the law and without seeking
assistance from state officials such as policemen or judges. Most people
are ignorant of the controlling law and are not inclined to invoke legal
entitlements in a drawn-out court battle, so they resolve disputes according
to a local code followed by members of their community, a code that is
backed up with informal private sanctions. As Ellickson explains in the
preface to Order Without Law, "this book seeks to demonstrate that people
frequently resolve their disputes in cooperative fashion without paying any
attention to the laws that apply to those disputes." 9 As the title suggests,
the absence of law does not lead to anarchy, but to a suitable "order"
based on informal but pervasive social norms.
Ellickson's project went beyond merely describing social norms in
Shasta County: He also posed the fundamental question of why these
particular social norms were adopted instead of others. Now a Marxist
might approach this question by looking at the role of class conflict in the
formation of social norms; a feminist might look at the role of patriarchy;
a critical race scholar might look at race; and so forth. Ellickson, however,
eschewed these approaches and instead attempted to explain social norms
by using a series of models drawn from the sociological tradition of
"methodological individualism"--the notion that sociological phenomena
are best explained as the result of individual decision-making as opposed
to larger collective forces such as class, race, gender, and ideology.10 In
keeping with methodological individualism, Ellickson holds that social
norms must be understood with models drawn from rational choice theory,
game theory, evolutionary biology, and economic analysis. 1 The use of
these models places Ellickson within the broad umbrella of law and
9. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at vii.
10. As Ellickson recently acknowledged:
The new norms scholars all hew to a rational-choice model of human behavior. This
methodological individualism--also dominant in economics, evolutionary biology, and public
choice theory-supposes that each individual generally is both rational and self-interested. As a
result, the new norms scholars have been influenced more by game theorists, who examine the
dynamic interactions of purposive actors, than by traditional sociologists, who employ a
methodological wholism that views aggregations such as cultures and social classes as operative
agents in the generation of norms.
Robert Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, Text of
Address at the University of Texas School of Law (Nov. 3, 2000) (on file with author) (hereafter,
Ellickson, Evolution of Social Norms). Ellickson's address was later published with slight
modifications as The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter
Ellickson, Market for Social Norms]. Ellickson wrote there that "[a] norm is not the product of 'diffuse
social forces,' as a sociologist might put it, but rather of the purposive actions of discrete
individuals .. "). Id. at 2.
II. Methodological individualism has been defined succinctly as "the doctrine that all
sociological explanations are reducible to the characteristics of individuals." See THE PENGUIN
DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 223 (Nicholas Abercrombie ed., 2000). Because methodological
individualism holds that social phenomena must be explained with reference to the decisions of
individual actors and not in terms of collective forces, it tends to downplay the determinative effects of
supra-individualistic structures such as class, race, gender, history, ideology, religion, bureaucracy,
and the division of labor. See, e.g., STEVEN LUKES, Methodological Individualism Reconsidered, in
ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY 177 (1977).
2003]
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economics scholarship, which focuses on the agreements of rational actors
and downplays the role of race, class, and gender.
Ellickson's project in Shasta County has proven wildly influential, to
the point where it constitutes a kind of blueprint for much of the emerging
scholarship on social norms. In the tradition of Order Without Law, many
of the norms scholars will conduct fieldwork on social norms in a
particular community, followed by rigorous analysis of the social norms
using rational choice theory, game theory, and economic analysis.'" In
keeping with Ellickson's insistence on scientific method and positivism, 3
norms scholars are especially interested in providing an account of social
norms that. generates verifiable predictions and thereby earns the mantle of
"science," positioning their work as "science" at the intersection of law,
sociology, and economics.' 4 Legal scholarship in this vein has become a
major force in academic circles. 5
In my opinion, Ellickson and the New Chicago School deserve credit
for bringing the topic of social norms to the forefront of legal scholarship,
and for making the important point that a great deal of thought and
behavior is not determined by law in the final instance, but rather by social
norms enforced by our peers. Having said this, I harbor strong reservations
about Ellickson's preferred methods for analyzing social norms. In
particular, Ellickson's faith in methodological individualism (and his
reliance on rational choice theory, game theory, economic analysis, and
evolutionary biology) leads him to ignore some important features of life
in Shasta County, most notably the impact of race, class, gender, history,
religion, and ideology. These important collective forces do not show up
on Ellickson's radar screen, because they are ruled out by his insistence on
explaining the norms of Shasta County as the result of individual
rationality and bargaining. I applaud Ellickson's work as a seminal step in
legal scholarship, but as a critical theorist, I must say that his methods
strike me as insufficiently historical, contextual, and critical. He views
12. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 6, at 174 (discussing how Ellickson's approach has prompted
members of the New Chicago School to consult empirical research on such disparate topics as foot-
binding in China, dueling in the nineteenth century South, relations between merchants, and inner-city
gun violence). At the University of Chicago Law School Roundtable, Professor Lisa Bernstein
described her fieldwork exploring the social norms of grain and feed merchants. Transcript, The New
Chicago School, supra note 5, at 4-6. Similarly, Professor Tracey Meares insisted that "[a] very
important part of this work is not just theorizing ... but also a willingness to go out there and do the
legwork in the eleventh district in the city of Chicago, in the highest crime district in the city, and see
what's actually going on." Id.at 11.
13. See ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 158 ("1 am a positivist and am therefore interested in making
and testing predictions."). Elsewhere, Ellickson faults law and society scholarship for being
insufficiently "scientific," and repeats the oft-heard accusation that law and society scholarship is a
"swamp." Id. at 147.
14. For example, Dan Kahan describes his work as "trying to negotiate the space between
sociology and economics." See Transcript, The New Chicago School, supra note 5, at 2.
15. See Richard McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Laws, Norms, and Economic Methodology,
110 YALE L.J. 625, 626 (2001) ("The number of articles using a rational choice framework to discuss
the interaction of law and norms is now too large to list even in a law review footnote.").
[Vol. 15:295
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human behavior through the lens of rational choice theory and celebrates
social norms as if they represented the culmination of rational bargains
among independent parties, thereby missing the ways in which social
norms can be cruel, oppressive, irrational, and racist. Hopefully, my
criticisms about methodology will persuade Ellickson (and members of
the New Chicago School) to drop the positivist insistence on "science"
and the demand for prediction/verification, and instead draw from the rich
sociological tradition of critical theory. This tradition includes some very
important figures whom Ellickson and his peers probably deem
"unscientific" and therefore verboten, such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber,
Foucault, Bourdieu, and Habermas, all of whom reject extreme
methodological individualism because it fails to provide a robust account
of social phenomena. To understand the norms of Shasta County or any
other indeterminate social text, there is nothing to be gained by invoking
science and verification: The most we can achieve is conversation from
multiple perspectives. As with any text (such as a movie, a book, a fashion
trend, etc.), the best we can do is to look at the text from various
angles--the feminist angle, the Marxist angle, the Freudian angle, the
postmodem angle, the rational choice angle, and then argue about which
of these interpretations seems to "fit" or "illuminate" the text. That is to
say, there is little to be gained by invoking "science" and "prediction"
when analyzing social norms.
Part I of this article provides an introduction to Ellickson's portrait of
social norms in Shasta County and traces his impact on the new norms
scholarship. Part II is an extended critique of Ellickson's depiction of
Shasta County based on my own library-based research into Shasta
County over a six-month period, combined with a four-day visit in the
spring of 2003 to the precise area that Ellickson depicted in Order Without
Law. Finally, Part III raises some doubts about the viability of continued
research grounded in Ellickson's methodological assumptions.
In considering Ellickson's depiction of Shasta County, the reader would
do well to keep in mind that what Ellickson saw was filtered through his
models, which stress rationality, games, and efficiency. These models
have a tendency to distort or simply ignore contrary evidence of
irrationality, oppression, and inefficiency, all of which can be found in
abundance in Shasta County and elsewhere. In short, my argument is that
to the extent that Ellickson's models fail to capture some important
dimensions of life in Shasta County, they ought to be supplemented or
replaced with critical approaches to social norms. Only with critical
models can we coherently explain what Ellickson missed about Shasta
County-for example, why Shasta County is overwhelmingly white, why
it has a brutal history of environmental devastation and genocide against
Native Americans, why most of the property owners are men, why it has
shocking rates of child poverty and substandard housing, and why it is
being overrun with strip malls and low-wage jobs.
2003]
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I. ELLICKSON'S DEPICTION OF SHASTA COUNTY
The path to Shasta County began in 1960 with the publication of the
seminal text of the law and economics movement, Ronald Coase's The
Problem of Social Cost.16 Coase's article set forth what has become
known as "Coase's theorem," which asserts that under conditions of zero
transaction costs (that is, assuming that people are rational, fully informed,
and patient), parties will bargain around inefficient legal rules to reach an
efficient arrangement that maximizes their collective resources. To
illustrate this theory, Coase sketched a hypothetical situation where a
rancher's cattle wander onto a neighbor's farm, causing damage. Under
traditional legal analysis (which Coase rejects), the law of negligence
places responsibility for the damage on one of the two parties, thereby
motivating that person to take precautions in order to avoid liability. For
example, if negligence law makes the rancher liable for an errant cow that
eats his neighbor's crops, then the rancher will take precautions against
liability by building a fence or reducing his herd. Conversely, if
negligence law makes the farmer liable when the errant cow eats the
crops, then the farmer will take precautions against liability by moving her
crops, building a fence, or ceasing to farm that particular stretch of land.
In the end, law has the final word in determining the parties' behavior
because the parties' behavior is a reaction to the legal rule. Under this
traditional way of thinking, judges and legislators play a central role in
shaping behavior.
Coase rejected this traditional analysis. According to Coase's model, the
actual rule of law announced by a court or legislature is not dispositive of
the parties' behavior, since the rancher and farmer can always go around
the law to create a private loss allocation (sometimes called a "side-
agreement") that would maximize their collective welfare. In other words,
the law sets a base-level position from which rational parties start to
bargain, but it does not necessarily determine where they will end up. As
Coase puts it: "It is always possible to modify by transactions on the
market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And of course, if such
market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will
always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of
production." 7
By stressing the possibility that rational parties will bargain around the
law, Coase challenged the longstanding assumption that law is the final
word in influencing behavior. Notice that Coase's model vests judges and
legislators with minimal impact on behavior. Indeed, if rational parties are
willing to circumvent the law to reach a more efficient allocation than
provided by law, there is little to be gained in fussing over the legal
question of who should bear the loss, since the parties will probably ignore
16. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
17. Id. at 15.
[Vol. 15:295
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the initial determination of rights anyway. In fact, if the parties have
sufficient time and bargaining power, they will reach an efficient outcome
regardless of the controlling law--regardless of whether the local law
places liability on the farmer or the rancher.
Ellickson summarizes Coase's theorem formally in the following terms:
"[W]hen transaction costs are zero a change in the rule of liability will
have no effect on the allocation of resources."' 8 He goes on to explain
what this means for the hypothetical rancher and farmer:
[Coase's] theorem predicts that making a rancher liable for damage
done by his trespassing cattle would not cause the rancher to reduce
the size of his herds, erect more fencing, or keep a closer watch on
his livestock. A rancher who is liable for trespass damage has a legal
incentive to implement all cost-justified measures to control his
cattle. But even if the law were to decline to make the rancher liable,
Coase reasoned that potential trespass victims would pay the rancher
to implement the identical trespass-control measures. In short, market
forces internalize all costs regardless of the rule of liability.' 9
Now Coase was quick to point out that his assumption of zero
transaction costs was implausible in the real world where parties face
significant obstacles and expenses in obtaining information about each
other, negotiating the terms of the deal, and so forth. When these
transaction costs exceed what the parties can gain by circumventing the
law, the parties will end up following the law by default. But as a matter
of pure theory, the Coase theorem holds that the law is largely irrelevant
in determining behavior because rational parties will circumvent an
inefficient law to reach a more efficient allocation of resources.
Coase's work gained ascendancy in the law and economics movement
during the 1970s and 1980s. At the time, Robert Ellickson was a professor
at Stanford Law School working in the field of law and economics, which
meant that he was well-versed in Coase's theorem and its hypothetical
scenario of the rancher and the farmer. Dissatisfied with library-based
scholarship, Ellickson came up with the novel idea of testing Coase's
hypothetical in the real world. To do this properly, he needed to compare
how farmers and ranchers behaved in two locations that differed only in
terms of the prevailing law of cattle trespass: one location where
18. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 2.
19. Id. This presumes, of course, that societal conditions are such that the parties have the power,
time, and ingenuity to reach an agreement that maximizes their welfare. By focusing on a mythical
world free from gross inequalities in bargaining power, Coase does not come to terms with the
historical reality of starvation wages, sweatshop conditions, poorhouses, industrial accidents, and the
absence of any safety net for the downtrodden. This lacuna in the literature of law and economics has
been pointed out by others. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIEs 151-85
(1987); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REv. 451, 478 (1974) (commenting that in the law and economics view of the world, "[t]here is no
place for the word or concept 'unable.' Thus, in this system, there is nothing which is coerced.").
2003]
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negligence law placed liability on the rancher, and one location where
liability was on the farmer. If Coase's model was correct, the parties in
both locations would bargain around the controlling law to reach the
identical allocations of resources.
Ellickson hit on Shasta County in Northern California as a particularly
good testing ground for Coase's model because the rules of trespass
liability shifted in different parts of the county depending on whether a
patch of land was designated by local authorities as an "open" or "closed"
range. In those parts of Shasta County where the range was open, the
rancher was generally not liable for damage caused by his cattle, whereas
in the closed range he was strictly liable for the damage. Ellickson decided
to compare how the ranchers and farmers behaved in the open and closed
ranges of Shasta County to see if Coase was correct that they would
bargain around the formal rule of law to reach the same arrangement. In
other words, Coase's model suggests that ranchers and neighbors would
behave the same all over Shasta County, regardless of whether they lived
in an area controlled by the law of the "open" range or the "closed" range.
Ellickson tested this theory during the 1980s, publishing his findings in a
seminal law review article,2" and then in Order Without Law.
Ellickson found that Coase was generally correct in predicting that law
was not the final determinant of behavior among farmers and ranchers.
But Coase was wrong in supposing that the parties would be aware of the
controlling rule of law and then bargain around it. In fact, the parties in
Shasta County often had no idea of the controlling law and were therefore
not in any position to bargain around it. It was common for people to
misstate the law, and sometimes they refused to admit that they
misunderstood the law even when confronted with the correct legal
doctrine. Ellickson found that ranchers and farmers in Shasta County
tended to follow a system of informal social norms and unwritten dispute
resolution techniques that had developed in the community over time, a
system enforced by gossip, shame, self-help, and other informal
mechanisms short of actual litigation. The most impressive aspect of
Ellickson's work remains his detailed study of these informal norms,
which required countless hours of fieldwork and immersion in the social
network of ranchers and farmers.
Having found that "some spheres of life seem to lie entirely beyond the
shadow of law,"21 Ellickson set out to explain why the residents of Shasta
County followed social norms instead of the law. He concluded that
people in Shasta County follow a general norm of "neighborliness"
because it increases the objective welfare of group members:
20. Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986).
21. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 283.
[Vol. 15:295
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Shasta County neighbors, it turns out, do not behave as Coase
portrays them as behaving in the Farmer-Rancher Parable. Neighbors
in fact are strongly inclined to cooperate, but they achieve active
cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from legally established
entitlements, as the parable supposes, but rather by developing and
enforcing adaptive norms of neighborliness that trump formal legal
entitlements. Although the route chosen is not the one that the
parable anticipates, the end reached is exactly the one that Coase
predicted: coordination to mutual advantage without supervision by
the state. 2
He later frames this norm of "mutual advantage" in the following terms:
The overarching substantive norm of the rural residents of Shasta
County is that one should be a "good neighbor." This is a general call
for cooperative behavior. Because this standard is so general, it is
vulnerable to conflicting interpretations in a concrete case. Perhaps as
a result, Shasta County residents have developed narrower informal
rules to govern certain ordinary interactions. [My] hypothesis asserts
that welfare maximization is the most parsimonious explanation of
the content of these workaday norms.23
The above quotations represent the two dimensions of Ellickson's study
of Shasta County-an empirical claim that neighbors follow social norms
instead of law, followed by a theoretical explanation that social norms
happen to be utilitarian because they increase the objective welfare of
members within a close-knit community. 4
When the time came to examine the phenomenon of social norms more
closely, Ellickson found himself having to choose between two theoretical
traditions: "law and society" versus "law and economics."25 For Ellickson,
law and society scholars tend to eschew system-building in favor Clifford
Geertz's notion of social explanation as "thick description," primarily
because these scholars "have their roots not in economics but in the more
humanistic social sciences such as history, sociology, and
anthropology."26 Like members of the critical legal studies movement, law
and society scholars tend to reject the rational actor model that dominates
economic analysis and game theory. 27 By contrast, Ellickson sees law and
economics as a scientific search for verifiable explanations of human
behavior, encompassing methodologies such as game theory, rational
choice theory, public choice theory, evolutionary biology, and economic
22. Id. at 3.
23. See id. at 185.
24. See id. at 170.
25. Id. at 6, 147.
26. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 7.
27. Id. at 157-58.
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models that, according to Ellickson, generate verifiable predictions.28
When faced with these competing traditions, Ellickson chose law and
economics. To be sure, he offered a few kind words for law and society
scholarship on account of its appreciation of fieldwork (and to this extent,
Ellickson sees his own work as law and society scholarship), but he
expressed a nagging sense that an emphasis on "local knowledge" cannot
lead to scientific principles about human behavior.29 For this reason,
Ellickson sided with law and economics and flatly declared that his book
was a "gauntlet thrown in the direction" of law and society scholarship.3"
As he explained, law and economics is preferable because of its clarity,
scientific method, and program for research: "Anyone who widely reads in
both law and economics and-law and society literature is bound to come
away feeling that economists-although often disturbingly blind to
realities--are clearer, more scientific, and more successful in building on
prior work.,
31
The reference to science might seem ill-placed for a law professor given
that law is an interpretive profession. It would be uncommon nowadays to
hear a professor claim, for example, that a majority opinion was
scientifically better than a minority opinion.32 But notice that the decision
to favor a "scientific method" is itself highly unscientific: Ellickson lauds
the "science" of law and economics, yet his praise of that movement is
based on a mere "feeling," which seems incongruous with the paean to
science. And just like that, without more (that is, without explaining how
law and economics has been more successful than law and society
scholarship, or how such success would be judged, or what criterion of
"science" or "clarity" he is invoking) Ellickson is off and running into
several modes of social explanation consistent with law and economics,
touching on game theory, rational choice theory, evolutionary biology,
and so forth. All these tools are grounded in the aforementioned tenets of
methodological individualism, meaning that they account for social
phenomena by referring to the behavior of rational, self-interested
individuals. In taking this approach, Ellickson rejects the interpretative
28. See ELLICKSON supra note 7, at 158 ("The subsequent analysis applies the rational-actor
model and also makes considerable use of game theory. I am a positivist and am therefore interested
in making and testing predictions.").
29. See id. at 7 (describing Clifford Geertz' view as holding that fieldwork can lead only to "local
knowledge" and "thick" anecdotal accounts of culture). Ellickson also states, however, that
"practitioners of law and economics, by contrast, rarely shirk from applying in every context the
model of rational, self-interested, human behavior that they borrow from economics proper." Id.
30. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 147.
32. The most notable person to make this claim was Christopher Columbus Langdell, former
Dean of Harvard Law School, who has been derided for the better part of a century for his assertion
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tradition of law and society scholarship with its attendant focus on large
collective forces such as class, race, gender, religion, or history.
Once Ellickson adopts a theoretical commitment to methodological
individualism, he is locked into the notion that people are rational, self-
interested, game-playing monads who cooperate with others to gain some
type of utility-boost. As he flatly acknowledges, his version of rational
choice theory "assumes, first, that each individual pursues self-interested
goals, and second, that each individual rationally chooses among various
means for achieving those goals. ''33 Given that each person (by definition)
is an isolated monad acting only for himself in a dog-eat-dog world,
Ellickson confronts a "puzzle of cooperation": 34 Why do these self-
interested persons come out of their caves, as it were, and cooperate with
each other? This puzzle is solved with an excursus into game theory,
which suggests that rational people will enter "cooperative" games that are
"welfare maximizing" when the players' choices lead to the "largest total
objective payoff available. 35 In other words, people will rationally decide
to come together and create social norms when the norms increase their
objective welfare. This, then, is Ellickson's hypothesis about Shasta
County: The farmers and ranchers have agreed on a set of dispute-
resolution norms that maximize their objective welfare.
But how does Ellickson--a self-professed positivist who demands
empirical evidence--propose to "verify" that a given social norm in
Shasta County (say, a social norm that permits farmers to gossip about
lazy ranchers) is more welfare maximizing than an alternative social
norm? For that matter, how do we prove that the norms of dispute
resolution in Shasta County are superior to other possible social norms of
dispute resolution, such as fistfights or using a Ouija board? According to
Ellickson (who earlier praised law and economics for its "scientific"
approach), we decide this question by using our intuition:
In most contexts the objective costs and benefits of alternative norms
are impossible to quantify with precision. Therefore, both norm-
makers and analysts of norms must fall back on largely intuitive
assessments of the utilitarian potential of alternative rules. This is the
33. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 156.
34. Id. at 156. Of course, this is only a "puzzle" because game theory assumes, wrongly, that
society is composed of self-sufficient adult hermits who can live in isolation and can afford to make a
concerted decision whether to cooperate with others. But given that no individual can be formed
without the social and public cooperation underlying language, myth, rituals, child-rearing, and
education, the "puzzle of cooperation" is not really a puzzle, except in the bizarre sense that I might
raise a "puzzle" about why my arm is connected to my torso. To be a human being is to be already
imbricated within a network of power relations. Game theory cannot accept that humans come to
"games" already situated in power relations and ideologies that determine their decision-making,
because this would mean that "games" are determined by factors outside the game itself-class, race,
history, ideology, patriarchy, and so forth-which would force game theorists back into the fuzzy
interpretive task of explaining how these structures affect the internal dynamics of the game.
35. Id. at 159.
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approach taken in the next four chapters [i.e., the remainder of
Ellickson's analysis of norms].36
So we have gone from science to intuition. And by the end of the book,
Ellickson has added significant qualifications to his tentative hypothesis
that social norms are welfare maximizing:
The hypothesis that close-knit groups generate norms that maximize
the objective welfare of group members was induced from scattered
observations in Shasta County and elsewhere. A more formal
analysis would have included an attempt to deduce the same
hypothesis from explicit axiom .... If verified, the hypothesis of
welfare-maximizing norms will have several normative implications.
The primary one is that, in situations where utilitarian concerns are
paramount, lawmakers interested in the resolution of humdrum
disputes that arise within a group are unlikely to improve upon the
group's customary rules.
37
These passages portend a dangerous circularity. Ellickson adopts a
model of human beings as naturally self-interested/rational/cooperative,
and he then concludes (based on inductive reasoning without verification)
that people in Shasta County are self-interested/rational/cooperative, and
that this cooperation has led them to adopt social norms of dispute
resolution that maximize their collective welfare. But this conclusion
follows from the model itself, not from the ethnographic data in Shasta
County. If you begin with an assumption that people are rational and self-
interested, you can easily generate an unverified hypothesis that they
adopt practices that are rational and self-interested. But even if Ellickson's
conclusions were valid, by his own admission they hold only for internal
group affairs on humdrum disputes in close-knit communities where
utilitarian concerns are paramount. This means that his approach doesn't
extend to most of the controversial issues in law (abortion, affirmative
action, reparations, socialized medicine, the minimum wage), nor does his
analysis extend to the anonymous encounters that make up the majority of
interpersonal contacts in large cities. We are left with what the author
concedes to be an "inductive" and "unverified" account of "workaday"
norms that arise to govern "humdrum disputes" within a "close-knit"
group. This hardly sounds like the foundation upon which to build a
research platform for understanding a nation that is predominantly
modernized, urban, and multicultural.
And there is a puzzling double gesture here, a strange attraction and
repulsion to the unique history of Shasta County. On the one hand,
36. Id. at 183.
37. Id. at 267, 283 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Ellickson says that a close-knit society occurs
only where group members have "continuing reciprocal power over one another and also a bank of
shared information." Id. at 248.
[Vol. 15:295
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Ellickson professes a deep interest in the particularities of Shasta County,
and toward this end he undertakes extensive fieldwork over a multi-year
period, throwing himself into the Shasta County culture and seemingly
concerning himself with the details of social life. Yet when he tries to get
a handle on this fieldwork, he adopts models that are ahistorical,
acontextual, uncritical, and which fail to draw upon the unique history and
culture of Shasta County. I would suggest that the culprit here is
Ellickson's initial reliance on the Coase theorem, which presents a model
that is not sufficiently attuned to the non-welfare-enhancing forces that
pervade collective social structures, including oppression, injustice,
struggle, alienation, and violence.
These shortcomings in Order Without Law (which are discussed at
length in the following Part of this Article) have not blunted Ellickson's
influence on contemporary legal scholarship, especially his influence on
the "New Chicago School." From the beginning, this movement has
attracted scholars from elite law schools, especially the University of
Chicago.38 Today, the movement is well-respected for its focus on
ethnographic research on diverse social groups,39 and for its insistence that
social groups often "opt out" of the legal system in favor of pursuing
informal mechanisms of social control such as gossip, shunning,
mediation, and self-help.4"
Whereas Ellickson's work was largely concerned with defending the
rationality of existing social norms, some members of the New Chicago
School are keen to suggest ways that the government might go one step
further to actually improve social norms, or to use the terminology of the
movement, to "seed" positive social norms via "norm entrepreneurship."4
For example, if gang activity is the result of destructive social norms that
predominate in neighborhoods where people feel alienated from the
38. After the movement was profiled in The New Yorker, see Rosen, supra note 6, a conference
was held at the University of Chicago Law School on the question of whether the "New Chicago
School" was myth or reality. See Transcript, The New Chicago School, supra note 5. Participants at
the conference included University of Chicago professors Lisa Berstein, Dan Kahan, Tracey Meares,
Randal Picker, and Eric Posner. Lawrence Lessig, then at Harvard Law School, did not attend. More
recently, Robert Ellickson listed the "norms scholars" as including Lisa Bernstein, Dan Kahan, Tracey
Meares, Eric Posner, Randal Picker, Richard McAdams, Lawrence Lessig, and Cass Sunstein. See
Ellickson, Evolution of Social Norms, supra note 10, at 2.
39. See, e.g., Berstein, supra note 4 (describing social norms among diamond merchants); Dan
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 356, 373 (1997)
(describing social norms among gang members); see also Transcript, The New Chicago School, supra
note 5, at 10 (quoting Tracey Meares's discussion of fieldwork in inner-city neighborhoods).
40. The focus on social norms explains why the movement is also known as "law and social
norms" or "the new norm scholarship." See Ellickson, Evolution of Social Norms, supra note 10, at 3
(referring to the "new norms scholars"); Eric Posner, The Signaling Model of Social Norms: Further
Thoughts, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 465 (2002) (referring to the movement of "law and social norms").
41. The term "norm entrepreneurship" comes from Cass Sunstein, who is often associated with
the New Chicago School. Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909
(1996); see also Robert Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
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community, then the government might have success in fighting crime by
reintroducing positive social norms through prayer vigils and midnight
basketball leagues.42 Similarly, the government might reduce tobacco
consumption by "seeding" anti-smoking norms among teenagers instead
of the current tactic of criminalizing teenage smoking and imposing severe
taxes on tobacco. 43 This strategy of governmental intervention is not
shared by all members of the New Chicago School. Some fear that this
strategy is a license for totalitarian mind control and propaganda
techniques, 4 while others doubt that the government has the savvy to
successfully intervene in the production and dissemination of social
norms.45 In any event, the movement casts doubt on whether law is the
most efficient means of social control, and its scholarship is marked by a
deep skepticism about governmental intervention. 46 This has prompted
one conservative critic to applaud the movement for its "implicit
libertarian bias, 47 while left-leaning critics have voiced suspicions that
the movement carries conservative baggage from the Old Chicago School
of law and economics, including the tendency to explain social behavior
through utilitarian models of analysis, like rational choice theory, game
theory, computer models, and market analogies.48 Even while the
42. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609 (1998) (advocating non-traditional methods such as curfews, public shaming, anti-loitering
ordinances, and having students "snitch" on each other for bringing guns to school); Tracey Meares &
Dan Kahan, Law and (Norms oJ) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 805, 832 (1998)
(suggesting that inner-city communities be allowed to "choose for themselves the law enforcement
policies that will work for them," such as curfews, community policing, church-police partnerships,
and shaming of offenders).
43. These examples are discussed by Tracey Meares and Eric Posner in Transcript, The New
Chicago School, supra note 5, at 7, 24.
44. For example, Lessig refers to this as the darker side of the movement: "Every space is subject
to a wide range of control; the potential to control every space is the aim of the school. There are good
reasons to resist this enterprise. There are good reasons to limit its scope." Lessig, supra note 5, at
690.
45. See ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 176 (2000) (arguing that legal intervention often
fails to change behavior and may actually trigger destabilizing norm cascades in which behavior
changes too rapidly, with destructive consequences).
46. For example, Eric Posner's position is representatively hesitant even while he acknowledges
that certain social norms can be destructive:
[Ilt's never clear whether government intervention is going to make people better off or worse
off in any give context .... Questions about desirable government behavior can only be
answered through trial and error and difficult practical judgments. Very little of what I do would
shed light on this; I resist any ideological label."
See Transcript, The New Chicago School, supra note 5, at 27.
47. Id. at 19 (quoting Richard Epstein). This bias seems real. The work of the New Chicago
School is more concerned with game theoretical models than with questions of meaning and
hermeneutics, such as whether justice requires fundamental rights to abortion, universal health care,
affirmative action, and so forth. This being said, there is nothing inherently right-leaning in the
movement simply because it focuses on social norms. The conservative bias is largely the result of
theoretical models that stress individual decision-making instead of the more holistic concerns about
justice, power, and inequality.
48. See Mark Tushnet, "Everything Old Is New Again ": Early Reflections on the "New Chicago
School," 1998 Wis. L. REv. 579 (1998).
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members of the New Chicago School resist ideological labels, there is no
question that the movement tends to be more popular with law professors
on the ideological right (especially those who favor law and economics)
than with left-leaning professors who favor critical legal studies, critical
race theory, feminist jurisprudence, and postmodernism. 49 To the extent
that the New Chicago School draws its framework from Ellickson's
scholarship and, in particular, Order Without Law, its work must seek to
address the problems that I raise with that book and Ellickson's prevailing
approach. Like Ellickson, or perhaps because of him, the movement places
too much faith in methodological individualism and a kind of naive
positivism that insists upon "science" and "verification" while
underestimating the impact of race, class, gender, ideology, and irrational
human emotions.5°
II. SHASTA COUNTY-WHAT ELLICKSON MISSED
I wish to raise three general problems with Ellickson's study of social
norms in Shasta County. First, Ellickson's depiction of Shasta County is
somewhat distorted by his focus on a small minority of Shasta County
residents, namely white male property owners. Starting from models
where everyone is roughly equal, rational and autonomous, he has no
reason to concern himself with the messy business of figuring out how
behavior is affected by the local blend of race, class, gender, and history.
A very different picture of Shasta County would have emerged had
Ellickson interviewed, say, Hispanic single mothers working at Wal-Mart
and living in substandard housing projects, or had he sought out the
remaining members of the Wintu tribe, which once populated the county.
This is not a conscious mistake on Ellickson's part, but nevertheless he
49. For example, Dan Kahan professes to be a political independent and apparently has a bumper
sticker saying "Subvert the Dominant Paradigm." Rosen, supra note 6, at 175. But his proposals for
crime control (public shaming, loitering ordinances, curfews) are conservative when compared with
left-leaning proposals for decriminalization, amnesty, and replacing punishment with treatment. Kahan
recognizes the high degree of alienation and hopelessness among inner-city kids who see the legal
system (and the police) as illegitimate, but he offers no deep structural analysis for solving this
problem other than to suggest schemes for how the community might police itself using non-
traditional methods that effectively "privatize criminal law," thereby skirting the whole issue of
governmental legitimacy. See Dan Kahan, Privitizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm
Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859 (1999); see also Tracey Meares, Norms,
Legitimacy, and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391 (2000) (proposing mechanisms for law
enforcement in a community that no longer accepts the legitimacy of the law). Needless to say, this
way of looking at criminal law ignores the deep questions of underlying racism, violence, and
exploitation that have made inner-city kids feel so estranged from the legal system in the first place.
50. Consider, for example, Eric Posner's justification for narrowing the focus:
I do not claim that rational choice theory can offer a complete explanation of social norms or of
cooperation. Cognition and emotion are not irrelevant. They just are not well enough understood
by psychologists to support a theory of social norms, and repeated but puzzled
acknowledgments of their importance would muddy the exposition of the argument without
providing any offsetting benefits.
POSNER, supra note 45, at 46.
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misses the potential biases that are hardwired into the models that he
favors. For example, even though Ellickson is a scholar in the field of land
usage, he fails to comment on the first thing that strikes any visitor to
Shasta County, namely that the county is being overrun by strip malls and
low-wage jobs that don't provide a living wage, health benefits, or a
sustainable community. The more one knows about the brutal history of
genocide, racism, pollution, and injustice in Shasta County, the more one
suspects that Ellickson's Shasta County is something of a fairy tale, and
that like all other fairy tales it performs the ideological function of
papering over a depressing reality.
Second, Ellickson is wrong to claim that entire areas of life are lived
outside the law. In fact, the law is virtually everywhere in contemporary
society because it constitutes social ontology by shaping identity,
property, rights, privileges, power, and bargaining position. People in
Shasta County and elsewhere do not confront each other "human qua
human" as it were, but rather in their legally-mediated classifications:
employer-employee, white-black, owner-lessee, creditor-debtor, citizen-
alien, and so forth. To talk about "property ownership" and "boundaries"
and "employers" is to talk about a society that is already mediated by law.
What Ellickson found is not that people live outside the law, but that
people can live outside litigation, which is true but not surprising given
the cost of litigation.
Third, and most important, Ellickson lapses into a positivism that
professes neutrality about the moral and political dimension of the social
norms that he is studying, as if law professors are "scientists" who no
longer talk about the justice of social practices but instead merely observe
the "data" of society. This professed scientific neutrality is doomed to
failure because the very terminology employed in the project of
discovering and assessing social norms--"objective welfare,"
"efficiency," "utility"--is loaded with fuzzy interpretations and value
judgments.5 To say that people in Shasta County maximize their
"objective utility" raises questions about what people value, why they
value it, and whether they should value it. The honest approach is to admit
that we are not engaged in "science" (whatever that means) but in offering
fuzzy interpretations of social constructions, openly admitting that the
"facts" that we observe are shaped by our normative commitments.
Understanding the norms of Shasta County is a project much closer to
literary criticism than to science.
51. The hidden normative commitments emerge in Eric Posner's account of social norms, where
he divides people into "good" and "bad" types based on how willing they are to engage in cooperative
transactions. Id. at 19. It is not clear how the New Chicago School can offer a "scientific" approach to
social norms when theorists say things like, "Poor people can be divided into good types and bad
types." POSNER, supra note 45, at 180. Even assuming (as I do) that this statement is not meant
derisively, the very usage of terms like "good" and "bad" as a way of describing people is evidence
that the movement cannot escape normative judgments by adopting a pretense of scientific neutrality.
[Vol. 15:295
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A. Ignoring Social Structure
From reading Order Without Law, one might get the mistaken
impression that Shasta County is full of farmers and ranchers, and that the
lifestyle is something like a Western movie (indeed, John Wayne is
mentioned as an influential figure). This impression arises because
Ellickson based his study on interviews with twenty-eight landowners in
Shasta County. He acknowledges that he tried to interview people who
"had either owned cattle, been victims of trespass incidents, or been active
in political battles over closed-range petitions. Particular stress was placed
on obtaining interviews with the owners of the largest farms and ranches
in the study area."52 Given this sampling of informants, his empirical
conclusions can be expected to reflect a narrow and homogenous
subculture of rural landowners. This constraint would be entirely
appropriate if the scope of Ellickson's project were limited to a study of
homogeneous rural landowners, but Ellickson subtly extends his findings
to the rest of the county and beyond. At one time he says that his findings
cannot be generalized beyond "close-knit" cultures (for example, he
insists that his theory of norms cannot account for interaction at a singles
bar in O'Hare Airport), yet the subtitle of the book is "How Neighbors
Settle Disputes" (not "How Ranchers and Farmers Settle Disputes"), and
the very first line of the book states the general proposition that "people
frequently resolve disputes in cooperative fashion without paying any
attention to the laws that apply to those disputes."53 In other words,
readers are led to believe that Shasta County is a microcosm of the rest of
the country. Certainly, this is how his work is received in the writings of
the New Chicago School.
But not so fast. Generalizing about "neighborly" behavior from
fieldwork among ranchers and farmers in Shasta County only makes sense
if the social conditions in Shasta County are replicated in the rest of the
country, a proposition which is doubtful.5 4 The noted anthropologist
Clifford Geertz warned about generalizing from unrepresentative studies
of small towns:
The Jonesville-is-America writ small (or America-is-Jonesville writ
large) fallacy is so obviously one that the only thing that needs
explanation is how people have managed to believe it and expected
others to believe it. The notion that one can find the essence of
national societies, civilizations, great religions, or whatever summed
up and simplified in so-called "typical" towns and villages is
52. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 292.
53. Id. at vii (emphasis added).
54. For example, I lived in Chicago over a twenty-year period, staying in five different apartment
buildings, and I never once knew my neighbors personally. In several of the buildings, one neighbor
attacked another, and twice (in college and then in law school) I lived in dormitories where one
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palpable nonsense. What one finds in small towns and villages is
(alas) small-town or village life. If localized, microscopic studies
were really dependent for their greater relevance upon such a
premise-hat they captured the great world in the little--they
wouldn't have any relevance.55
So there is an immediate question of whether Ellickson's conclusions
hold beyond a narrow subculture of rural landowners. In my opinion, his
results cannot be generalized to most of America, or even to most of
Shasta County, for that matter.
The jacket cover of Order Without Law depicts a barbed wire fence and
a geological survey apropos of a Western motif, but the reality of Shasta
County is drastically different. At the time when the book was published,
Ellickson conceded that only 1% of the land was used for harvested crops
and that most of the land was covered by forests owned by the government
and corporations.56 The population of Shasta County is 168,500, with
more than 60% of the people living in the three cities of Redding,
Anderson, and Shasta Lake, and a good percent more living in the
neighboring suburbs. 57 Therefore, only a small portion of the county can
be characterized as rural. According to the most recent figures that I could
find, the federal census found 63,426 households in Shasta County, but the
Department of Agriculture found only 850 "farms" (this figure includes
both ranches and farms).58 Only 350 of these farms are full-time
operations, and only 130 of these have sales of crops or livestock in excess
of $25,000. 59 All told, only $31 million in agricultural products comes out
of Shasta County. By way of comparison, Los Angeles County has more
farms and generates $237 million in agricultural sales.6" Shasta County,
then, is not a farming and ranching center, and only 1% of its population is
55. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 21-22 (1973). In other words, if the
behavior of people in Shasta County is representative of American behavior generally, then there is no
reason to go all the way to Shasta County to do fieldwork in the first place-you could just as well
study "neighbors" in a New York hi-rise building. Ellickson sees Geertz's work as "insufficiently
scientific" for his insistence on microlevel studies that emphasize local knowledge over universal
principles. See ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 155.
56. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 17.
57. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS 2000: Shasta County, Cal. (showing
figures for 1990 and 2000), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/060891k.html (last
visited May 8, 2003) (on file with author). According to these figures, the population of Shasta County
has grown by 11% since Ellickson wrote Order Without Law in 1991. Id.
58. See U.S. Dep't. of Agric., 1997 Census for Shasta County, Cal., available at
http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/profiles/ca/capO45.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2002) (on file
with author).
59. Id.
60. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 1997 Census for Los Angeles, Cal., available at
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engaged in farming or ranching.6' Ellickson concedes that most of the land
is owned by the U.S. government and a handful of logging companies,
62
hardly the "neighbors" that come to mind when reading Order Without
Law. In other words, Ellickson based his account of "neighbors" on an
atypical and miniscule segment of the population in Shasta County.
If the residents of Shasta County are not "down on the farm," where are
they? Statistically speaking, they are working at chain stores and strip
malls. The Shasta County Economic Development Corporation boasts
that:
There are 12 major shopping areas including 2 enclosed malls and 9
major shopping centers and factory outlet centers. National chain
retailers include: Barnes & Noble, Big 5 Sporting Goods, Circuit
City, Costco, Gottschalks, Home Base, JCPenny, K-Mart, Longs
Drugs, Mervyns, Montgomery Wards, Office Max, Rite Aid, Sears,
Target, Wal-Mart, Walgreen Drugs, WinCo, Home Depot, Macy's,
Office Depot, Ross, ShopKo, Men's Warehouse, Food4Less,
Safeway, Raley's, and more coming.63
Virtually none of these businesses is incorporated or headquartered in
Shasta County. They pay minimal wages and do not provide an equity
stake for workers, let alone union membership. All of these jobs involve
constant interaction with strangers and endless management antagonism.
64
Statistically, more people in Shasta County are working dead-end jobs at
Wal-Mart, McDonald's, and Taco Bell than are engaged in farming and
ranching.65 This data cast doubt on whether Ellickson's model---based on
animal trespass disputes--captures how neighbors behave in the bulk of
Shasta County, let alone the rest of the country. Consider this: As of the
year 2000, 28.2% of children in Shasta County were living below the
poverty level,66 21% of the housing was substandard, the county's arrest
and mental health numbers were nearly twice the California average, and
61. See State of Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't, County Snapshot, Shasta 2002, available at
http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/COsnaps/shastSNAP.pdf (last vistited Nov. 30, 2002) (on file with
author).
62. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 16.
63. http://www.shastaedc.org/demographics.asp Econ. Dev. Corp. of Shasta County, County
Demographics, available at http://www.shastaedc.org/demographics.asp (last visited Nov. 30, 2002)
(on file with author).
64. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA
(2002) Ehrenreich provides a brilliant account of the friction between workers and managers at Wal-
Mart and similar mega-stores, and she describes the limited options available to workers: "Sure, you
can drive for five minutes and get somewhere else--to Kmart, that is, or Home Depot, or Target, or
Burger King, or Wendy's, or KFC. Wherever you look, there is no alternative to the megascale
corporate order, from which every form of local creativity and initiative has been abolished by distant
home offices." Id. at 179.
65. See Shasta County Private Industry Council, Report on Some of Shasta County's Largest
Employers-2001, available at http://www.norcalink.com/norcalink/shasta-employers.html (last
visited Nov. 30, 2002) (on file with author).
66. See the figures for the year 2000 in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 57.
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the county generated nearly double the per-person air pollution of other
counties in California.67 In Ellickson's Shasta County, there is no
alienation, poverty, homelessness, anonymity, or class struggle, precisely
because the ethnographic research was skewed, so that these issues never
arose. And the problem goes back to Coase's model, which focused on
landowners instead of, say, low-wage workers. From reading Order
Without Law, a legal scholar might expect to find cowboys and ranchers in
Shasta County, yet when I recently visited Shasta County I found the same
sterile and depressing landscape that one would find in Anytown, USA-a
dilapidated downtown ringed with ugly strip malls, surrounded by
concentric circles of mid-level houses and trailer parks.
Ellickson does not mention the race of the people he interviewed, but
Shasta County is shockingly white-nearly 90% (whereas California is
59.5%); African-Americans are less than 1% (California: 6.7%);
Hispanics are 4% (California: 32%); Asians are less than 2% (California:
11%).68 You get the idea: Ellickson has skewed the ethnographic research
to provide a false picture of a harmonious community where people follow
social norms instead of law. But the fact that Christian/white/male/middle-
class/rural people tend to get along instead of suing each other is not so
surprising. The big question-which Ellickson never asks or answers-is
how the target population became so homogeneous in the first place. The
answer to this question surely requires a complicated examination of
history, race, gender, ideology, and economics. Yet Ellickson did not
examine these factors because his models focus on rationality and game
playing. Again, Coase is the source of the problem: His model is based on
homo economicus ("rational man") and brackets all considerations of race,
class, or gender-leading Ellickson, in turn, to ignore these factors.6 9
There are two lessons here: First, Ellickson's findings about neighborly
67. See Cal. Inst. for County Gov., 2001 County Profiles, Shasta County Profile, available at
http://www.cicg.org/publications/ profiles/shasta county.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2002) (on file with
author).
68. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 57.
69. To see the bias inherent in the concept of homo economicus, consider how rarely economists
devote attention to persons other than rationally-calculating males who bargain in the public sector.
See, e.g., Marianne Ferber & Julie Nelson, Introduction to BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST
THEORY AND ECONOMICS 4, 7 (Marianne Ferber & Julie Nelson eds., 1993) ("Women have been
largely absent not only as economic researchers but also as the subjects of economic study .... At a
minimum, gender ideology can make a difference in what problems are selected for research, how
research is operationalized, and how findings are interpreted."). In a sign, however, that economics
might be relaxing the strict version of homo economicus, the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics went to a
psychologist who challenges the assumption that people always act rationally. See Jon Hilsenrath,
Nobel Winners for Economics Are New Breed, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2002, at B 1. Some of these points
are being incorporated into the emerging movement of "behavioral law and economics," but even here
the focus is not on cultural forces, such as race and gender, but rather on individual proclivities, such
as the tendencies of all people to avoid risk, to prefer the status quo, and to be optimistic about the
future. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 1, 4 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000) (suggesting that
theorists in this area seek to "qualify" rational choice models to achieve better predictions of behavior,




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol15/iss2/2
Litowitz
behavior cannot (without further proof) be generalized to more diverse
societies, and second, the methods of rational choice theory and game
theory cannot capture the full picture of social life. Ellickson has
essentially depicted a world where class, race, gender, and history do not
matter.
But as the saying goes, race matters.7 0 And the same goes for gender
and class. These are not just "local" and "surface" variations that can be
tacked onto a basic account of primordial human nature in the way that
clothes are draped over a mannequin: They are determinative of behavior
all the way down. Consider for example H. Rap Brown's frank discussion
of how race affects behavior:
Color is the first thing that Black people in america [sic] become
aware of. You are born into a world that has given color meaning and
color becomes the single most determining factor of your existence.
Color determines where you live, how you live and, under certain
circumstances, if you will live. Color determines your friends, your
education, your mother's and father's jobs, where you play, what you
play and more importantly, what you think of yourself.71
The same can be said of gender and class: They set expectations for the
clothes you wear, the accent you use, what church you attend, where you
live, what you eat and drink, and how you deal with others.7 Presumably,
these factors have an impact on social norms in Shasta County.
And then there is the question of history. Ellickson devotes a mere page
or two to the history of Shasta County, even though most sociologists and
historians would be inclined to believe that the history of the county is
highly relevant in terms of explaining behavior among farmers and
ranchers in Shasta County. It turns out that the history of the county is
particularly brutal, and worth recounting to get some idea of how ranchers
and farmers came to own land there.
As late as the 1830s, there were no white people in what is now Shasta
County. The land was technically owned by Mexico but it was basically
left to self-governance by the decentralized Native American Indians who
lived in the shadow of Mount Shasta-namely the Wintu, Siskiyou,
Shastan, and other tribes. The first major white figure in Shasta County
was a Mr. Pierson Reading, who in 1844 got a free grant of tens of
thousands of acres from the government of Mexico. He secured title to the
property by surrendering his citizenship to Mexico. In 1848, the State of
California claimed the land from Mexico, and Shasta County was
70. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1994).
71. H. RAP BROWN, DIE NIGGER DIE! 2 (1969).
72. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATTERS 2 (2000) ("More and more, our
nation is becoming class-segregated. The poor live with and among the poor."); see also PIERRE
BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (1984) (using statistical
data on consumption habits to map the class distinctions in French society).
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officially formed two years later. Immediately the whites laid siege to the
native Indians, but under a California law enacted in 1850, 7" Indians were
not allowed to give testimony against whites, thus denying them legal
recourse to stem the atrocities.74 This was, of course, the era of the
California Gold Rush, which brought a massive influx of lawless
speculators who blasted the mountains and dredged the streams,
destroying the native habitat and terrorizing the Indians. Some time later,
the federal Homestead Act of 1862 gave acreage to any citizen with ten
dollars to spare,75 prompting people to purchase the government land and
then surreptitiously sell to large landowners, who consolidated the land
into larger plots and drove off the Indians. In the following decades, as
Ellickson acknowledges, the Southern Pacific Railroad came through the
county under a government handout of free acreage for twenty miles on
either side of the tracks.76 The railroad hired Chinese laborers to lay the
tracks under conditions of virtual slavery while the local residents formed
an anti-Chinese society whose publications have been preserved and are
on display for tourists to see at the renovated courthouse in Old Shasta
Town (the county courthouse was later moved to nearby Redding). By the
end of the century, copper had replaced gold as the key mineral to be
found in Shasta County, bringing copper plants that destroyed the
environment and had to be closed under court order.77 To this day, the Iron
Mountain Mine in Shasta County is one of the nation's most notorious
Superfund sites, dumping hundreds of thousands of pounds of toxic
chemicals into the Sacramento River each year. It was recently subject to a
consent decree approved by the Environmental Protection Agency.78 The
Iron Mountain Mine discharges one-fourth of all the copper and zinc that
pollutes surface waters in the entire nation, prompting an EPA official to
73. Act for the Government and Protection of Indians, Statutes of Cal., ch. 133, sec. 6 (Apr. 22,
1850)("... but in no case shall a white man be convicted on any offence upon the testimony of an
indian.").
74. See, e.g., THE DESTRUCTION OF CALIFORNIA INDIANS 293 (Robert Heizer ed., 1974)
(reproducing copies of articles from Shasta County and San Francisco newspapers that describe in
vivid detail the abuses heaped on Indians in Shasta County, including kidnapping, rape, and murder);
see also PETER KNUDTSON, THE WINTuN INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA 15-16 (1977) ("Although the
Wintun suffered through years of racial discrimination, forced labor, and violent deaths (the latter
were reported quite casually by the newspapers), many fared much better than members of
neighboring tribes.").
75. Act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the Public Domain, 37 Cong. Ch. 75, 12 Stat.
392 (1862) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §161) (repealed 1976).
76. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 20.
77. In one well-known case, the Ninth Circuit reversed an injunction of the Northern District of
California, thereby keeping open a highly toxic copper plant. See Mountain Copper v. United States,
142 F. 625 (9th Cir. 1906) (finding that the factory was spewing pollution, but reasoning that the
affected land was largely unused, and thus the economic loss of closing the factory outweighed the
damage to the environment).
78. See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., No. S-91-0768 (E.D. Cal. consent decree
filed Dec. 8, 2000) (on file with author).
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say that the mine is a "huge environmental problem .... It's just mind-
boggling."79
The effect of this brutal history is described in a handbook on California
Indians:
In 1850, Shasta County was created. Soon thereafter, two massacres
occurred. The Whites gave a "friendship feast," poisoned the food,
and killed 100 Trinity Wintu. When the Trinity people tried to warn
the wenemem Wintu, they were too late; at least 45 were killed. In
185 1, the Whites tried to control the land by forcing the Wintu to the
west side of Clear Creek and dynamiting a natural rock bridge
crossing. In the town of Old Shasta, miners burned down the Wintu
council meeting house and massacred about 300 of the people ....
[T]hroughout the 1860s, the Wintu were hunted down, captured, and
forcibly marched to the coastal reservation .... Copper-processing
plants in the 1890s and 1900s poisoned and destroyed natural
vegetation and large groves of trees, and farmers of nearby regions
had to file lawsuits against them for damages .... In 1938 work on
the Shasta Dam began, and in the 1970s three dams flooded Wintu
territory. The dams did more to disperse the last large concentrations
of Wintu than any other factor.8°
The Great Depression saw a massive influx of migrant workers who
toiled for subsistence wages and lived in shanty towns, under constant
threat of violence for any hint of labor organizing. Noted author John
Steinbeck wrote about conditions in the area surrounding the city of
Redding in Shasta County, condemning the treatment of workers and
minorities. 81 This legacy continues: The State of California recently
enacted legislation to protect immigrant farm workers from what the
Governor called "threadbare conditions for workers," with one worker
describing the working conditions as follows: "If you argue with your boss
about something, he'd call immigration authorities on you and you'd be
tossed out of the country."
82
This is the history of Shasta County--genocide, corporate welfare,
environmental destruction, racism, greed, and exploitation. The past
shapes the present. At the very least, it might be relevant in explaining the
current behavior of ranchers and farmers. Perhaps the high level of
cooperation in Shasta County is the result of a homogeneous population of
79. Richard Paddock, Iron Mountain Mines Defy Efforts to Stop Toxic Flow, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1993, at Al.
80. Frank R. Lapena, The Wintu, in 8 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: CALIFORNIA
324, 324-25 (Robert Heizer ed., 1978).
81. JOHN STEINBECK, THE HARVEST GYPSIES: ON THE ROAD TO THE GRAPES OF WRATH (2002)
(commenting on working conditions in the Sacramento Valley, including the City of Redding in
Shasta County).
82. Nick Madigan & John Broder, California Governor Signs Law To Aid Farm Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2002, at A18.
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whites, a condition built on the marginalization of all other ethnic groups.
The "objective welfare" that Ellickson cites among "neighbors" was
purchased by driving out all the neighbors who were different. None of
this shows up on Ellickson's radar screen because the models that he
favors (rational choice theory, game theory, economic theory) are entirely
synchronic--they have no diachronic grasp of history. Even if we concede
that Ellickson correctly portrayed a small sliver of life among a tiny rural
section of Shasta County in the 1980s, for all practical purposes that world
no longer exists. For example, much of Ellickson's book centers on the
Oak Run territory near Round Mountain, but when I drove to that area I
found only some scrubby land, steep mountains barely suitable for cattle
or crops, a few small farms with a handful of animals, some dilapidated
shacks with burned out cars, and a depressing trailer park. While I have no
reason to doubt the accuracy of Ellickson's depiction of that area during
the 1980s, I question the continuing veracity of any model of social norms
that was drawn from such an ephemeral social configuration, a model that
no longer seems applicable to that very part of Shasta County on which it
was based, let alone the remainder of Shasta County or the rest of the
country. Ellickson's model is essentially synchronic and ahistorical: He
mistook time-bound social norms for universal norms.
It was Nietzsche who first pointed out the mistake of accepting the
prevailing morality as if it were raw data without a historical
understanding of the power relations that shaped it in the first place, and
that is why he insisted on a "Genealogy of Morals" that sought to expose
the underlying hypocrisies, contradictions, blind spots, and limitations
beneath the ruling morality. 3 Nietzsche knew that it was possible to work
within what he referred to as the Christian "slave morality," but he thought
that a more important project was to show how this prevailing morality
was not inevitable (and therefore beyond criticism), but was instead highly
contingent, representing a reversal of the perhaps superior Greek morality.
One need not agree with Nietzsche's radical denunciation of Christian
morality to recognize his point that we need to dig below the surface
morality to expose the power relations that sustain it. More recently,
Michel Foucault made a similar point about the need to interrogate the
prevailing conception of rationality: "What is this reason that we use?
What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its
dangers?"84 In the case of Shasta County, a full picture of social norms
should include a historical account of how the present-day norms relate to
83. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 20 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J.
Hollingdale trans., 1989) ("Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the
value of these values themselves must first be called into questionand for that there is needed a
knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew.... One has taken the value of
these 'values' as given, as factual, as beyond all question .... ).
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deeper forces of capitalism, patriarchy, xenophobia, religion, racism, and
so forth.
In the chain of scholarly influence extending from Coase to Ellickson to
the New Chicago School, there is little appreciation for the role of the
theorist in constituting the social reality that he purports to discover. This
inattention to perspective is a fundamental deficiency of the prevailing
norm analysis that cannot be stressed enough. There is no "Shasta County
morality" out there waiting to be discovered in the same way that one
finds a rock on the side of a stream. The "social norms" of Shasta County
are a theoretical construction shaped by the theorist in his initial choice of
whom to interview and which theoretical framework to use when sifting
through the ethnographic research. This process of constructing one's
object of study is neither good nor bad--the positing of constructs is
inevitable in all social theories.85 It means simply that a theorist should be
aware of the potential distortions of her model and the predispositions that
she imposes on the subject matter. This has been a basic point of all
inquiry in both the natural and human sciences ever since "Heisenberg's
Principle." As critical theorist Theodor Adorno warned, "The detached
observer is as much entangled as the active participant; the only advantage
of the former is insight into his entanglement., 86 With respect to Shasta
County, Ellickson made a choice to interview people who happened to
look a lot like himself-white male middle-class landowners. He did not
study the social norms of African-Americans, poor white single mothers,
Korean shop owners, low-wage workers at Taco Bell, prison inmates, or
welfare recipients. He did not seek out the remaining members of the
Wintu tribe that once populated Shasta County, nor did he talk to the
homeless people, prostitutes, and migrants sleeping under bridges in
Redding. None of these people were interviewed because they don't fit the
classical model of a "rational actor," who is typically a white male
property owner. Ellickson picked a target audience based on Coase's
parable of the rancher and farmer without realizing that the parable
reflects a moral judgment about the types of persons worthy of
investigation.
85. Sociologists going back to Max Weber have explained the need for constructing "ideal types"
in sociology. See, e.g., Max Weber, Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy, in
UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 34 (Fred Dallmyer & Thomas McCarthy eds., 1977) ("An
ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis
of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified
analytical construct.").
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B. People Don't Live "Outside the Law"
Ellickson repeatedly asserts that "large sections of social life are located
and shaped beyond the reach of law,"87 and that "[i]n many contexts, law
is not central to the maintenance of social order."88 He bases these
statements on the fact that neighbors rarely pursue formal claims against
each other in a court of law, instead resolving disputes according to social
norms that provide for informal punishments, such as gossip, payments in-
kind, expense-sharing, self-help remedies, and other adjustments short of
adjudication. This notion that people live "outside the law" is the claim for
which Ellickson is best known in legal circles.
But we have to be careful here not to conflate "law" and "litigation."
Neighbors can live outside litigation (that is, they can resolve disputes
without setting foot in a courtroom), but they cannot live outside the law.
In fact, there is no place in America that is outside the law; one is always
situated within a grid of legal relations, as a citizen, taxpayer,
employer/employee, lessee/owner, and so forth. Even "Shasta County" is
a legal construct, and it is only by virtue of law that people in Shasta
County have a county government that can designate "open" and "closed"
ranges, record deeds for property ownership, educate children, and create
roads and bridges. Law regulates and shapes the lives of every person who
drives a car, pays taxes, votes, owns a home, gets a paycheck, and so
forth. Ellickson's claim that people live outside the law misses the deeper
point that law is constitutive of social ontology.
To put the point differently, people who get into disputes already bear
the stamp of legal categories (employer/employee, landlord/tenant,
creditor/debtor). Law does not merely stand above and regulate a pre-
existing society, but is already "on the ground," causing a society to exist
in a particular way, all the way down. 89 Even personal identity is defined
by categories and classifications that are legal or quasi-legal, such as
citizenship, employment, housing, property holdings, and marital status.
All of this suggests that Ellickson and others are wrong to claim that entire
areas of life are lived outside the law. One can only guess that they arrived
at this conclusion because the dominant legal arrangement in America has
become so reified in their eyes that they see it as part of the furniture of
the universe. Since they are not personally bumping up against the
87. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 4.
88. Id. at 280.
89. As Pierre Bourdieu explains, law is a method of social construction: "The law is the
quintessential form of 'active' discourse, able by its own operation to produce its effects. It would not
be excessive to say that it creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is this world which
first creates the law." Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Towards the Sociology of the Juridical
Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 839 (1986).
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brutalities and strictures of the law, they are less attuned to its
omnipresence. 90
C. Against Positivism
Ellickson's explanatory arsenal is essentially positivistic--he offers no
moral or political evaluation of the prevailing norms in Shasta County.
Nowhere in Order Without Law does he express shock, disgust, disdain,
sympathy, or any other ethical/normative reaction to what he sees in
Shasta County. When it comes time to assess the morality of social norms,
Ellickson claims only that social norms tend to be welfare maximizing for
members of a close-knit group. As for others who happen to come into
contact with a social group, there is very little to say: "[T]he hypothesis of
welfare-maximizing norms provides no basis for expecting that norms will
serve certain ends, such as corrective or distributive justice, that
policymakers might regard as relevant, or even paramount."9 This
agnosticism toward the morality of social norms gets picked up in the
work of the New Chicago School. For example, Eric Posner's widely-
praised book Law and Social Norms puts forth a descriptive (but not
normative) claim that social norms are behavioral regularities whereby
people signal to others their capacity and willingness to cooperate. 92 Both
Ellickson and Posner concede that social norms can become destructive
(even the Ku Klux Klan had social norms, after all) but they are strangely
silent on how we might go about evaluating social norms. In the name of
science, these thinkers try to disconnect their ethical reflexes from their
object of study. It is as if they 'do not want to get too emotional because it
might taint their scientific, objective view of social norms, just as a doctor
does not want to get too involved with a patient lest it influence the
diagnosis. The idea is to study social norms in a scientific way by
bracketing out the evaluative moral and political assessments, to study
social norms by generating predictions that can be scientifically verified.
This project is doomed to failure. There is no way to talk about
"objective welfare," "efficiency," or "evolutionary adaptation" without
getting involved in messy evaluative matters of morality and politics. To
see this point, ask yourself how Ellickson or any member of the New
Chicago School would "scientifically" evaluate the social norms at play
when a person in Shasta County enters into a contract to work at Wal-
90. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, ".... The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistence and the Legal
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 344 (1990) (finding that "law is, for
people on welfare, repeatedly encountered in the most ordinary transactions and events of their lives.
Legal rules and practices are implicated in determining whether and how welfare recipients will be
able to meet some of their most pressing needs. Law is immediate and powerful because being on
welfare means having a significant part of one's life organized by a regime of legal rules .....
91. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 283-84.
92. POSNER, supra note 45, at 19, 34. ("To distinguish themselves from bad types, good types
engage in actions that are called 'signals' .... Social norms describe the behavior regularities that
occur in equilibrium when people use signals to show that they belong to the good type.").
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Mart. Do we say that this transaction increases the parties' objective
welfare, because after all they would not have entered the employment
relationship if it was not welfare-maximizing for both sides? Or do we say
that the contract is born of desperation and that it will decrease objective
welfare by perpetuating a cycle of dead-end jobs and alienated labor? Is
the shift from mom-and-pop businesses to giant mega-stores in Shasta
County consistent with evolutionary theory, or is it devolution? When
poor people apply for a job that pays inadequate wages and provides no
health insurance or union membership, is that a strategy in a game? When
Wal-Mart insists that employees remain after-hours on an unpaid basis,
and the workers sabotage the merchandise in retaliation, is that a social
norm that increases objective welfare?93 These concepts--objective
welfare, utility maximization, efficiency, and the like--are inherently
contestable and subject to interpretation: They are not descriptions, but
evaluations, and they invoke an unscientific web of fuzzy beliefs about
morality. There is no way to verify "efficiency" or "welfare" by looking at
the "raw data" of Shasta County, because the "raw data" is itself a product
of interpretation. The best a theorist can do is to offer an interpretation of
what is going on in Shasta County, and this interpretation can only be
contested by another interpretation, and another, and another, and so on.
The "scientific method" that Ellickson finds so praiseworthy can tell us
the height of Mount Shasta and the rainfall in the county, but no amount of
science can tell us whether a social norm is "welfare-maximizing," any
more than science can tell us whether a person is "a good parent.' 94 There
is no way to coherently talk about a social norm being welfare-
maximizing or efficient without asking, "For whom?" and "With respect
to what framework?" These are precisely the normative questions that
Ellickson and the New Chicago School have bracketed from
consideration.
The bigger problem with positivism in the social sciences is that it
fetishizes the social constellation as it presently exists, thereby missing the
distortions and structural inequalities that undergird the status quo.
Ellickson and the New Chicago School tend to adopt the attitude toward
social norms that, quoting Hegel, "What is rational is actual; and what is
93. Karen Olsson, Up Against Wal-Mart, MOTHER JONES MAGAZINE, Mar./Apr., 2003, at 54, 56
("Workers in twenty-seven states are suing Wal-Mart for violating wage-and-hour laws; in the first of
the cases to go to trial, an Oregon jury found the company guilty in December of systematically
forcing employees to work overtime without pay.").
94. With all of this talk about the need for scientific method, it is worth recalling that Einstein, the
quintessential scientist of the twentieth century, argued that "science" could not provide criteria for
solving social problems: "Science, however, cannot create ends and, even less, instill them in human
beings; science, at most, can supply the means by which to attain certain ends .... For these reasons,
we should be on our guard not to overestimate science and scientific method when it is a question of
human problems ... " Albert Einstein, Why Socialism?, in ESSAYS IN HUMANISM 2 (1953).
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actual is rational."95 But a theorist need not take the prevailing norms as
rational. Consider, for example, the work of former Yale professor Stanley
Milgram, whose classic experiments on obedience to authority (in which
people were told to administer "electric shocks" to others) were a mixture
of description and criticism. Milgram described the tendency of people to
mindlessly obey authority figures, and then he set about explaining the
dangers of this tendency and its implications for the future.96 The need for
a critical component to one's research was explained by social critic and
philosopher Jiirgen Habermas:
The systematic sciences of social action, that is economics,
sociology, and political science, have the goal, as do the empirical-
analytic sciences, of producing nomological [law-governed]
knowledge. A critical social science, however, will not remain
satisfied with this. It is concerned with going beyond this goal to
determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of
social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen
relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed. To the
extent that this is the case, the critique of ideology, as well,
moreover, as psychoanalysis, take into account that information
about lawlike connections sets off a process of reflection in the
consciousness of those whom the laws are about. Thus, the level of
unreflected consciousness, which is one of the conditions of such
laws, can be transformed.97
The same point is stressed in clearer language by Herbert Marcuse in his
insistence that we go below the level of ordinary discourse to discern the
structural constraints that underlie seemingly free actions:
In speaking their own language, people also speak the language of
their masters, benefactors, advertisers. Thus they do not only express
themselves, their own knowledge, feelings, and aspirations, but also
something other than themselves .... [W]hat they mean cannot be
taken at face value-not because they lie, but because the universe of
thought and practice in which they live is a universe of manipulated
contradictions.98
In other words, the New Chicago School should not assume that people
are transparent, rational, and self-concerned; people are just as often
internally divided, deluded, and irrational. People have been known to
95. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 20 (Allen Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821).
96. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 189 (1974) ("The results, as seen and felt in
the laboratory, are to this author disturbing.").
97. JORGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 310 (Jeremy Shapiro trans.,
1971).
98. HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 193-94 (1964).
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follow social norms that are ruinous and hostile to their own deeper
interests. The task of the legal theorist is not to mirror or affirm existing
norms by positing an underlying rationality beneath the surface of existing
culture (to herald the masterful logic of the here-and-now), but to see the
culture in light of our deepest commitments to justice and emancipation.
Part of the problem here is that the methodological individualism
favored by Ellickson and the New Chicago School brackets all questions
of structure and instead views people as isolated monads who freely
choose all of their actions. This is a radical discounting of social structure,
as if individuals stood on one end of a large field and the rest of society
stood on the other end, forcing the individual to decide whether to play the
"game" of cooperation with others. Thus, Ellickson reports that "people
often choose informal custom over law" because custom is
"administratively cheaper" and "more likely to be welfare-maximizing,"99
while Eric Posner says that "rational self-interest" is what "drives people
to cooperate."100 This way of thinking incorrectly characterizes the
relationship between structure and agency by redefining all of the
structures as if they were freely chosen by the agent, when in fact most
people do not choose the structures that confine their agency. For
example, I did not choose to grow up in a capitalist society, in a
democracy, as a middle-class male, or with English as my native
language, but these are structures that constrain my agency nonetheless.
To say that people in Shasta County choose to cooperate is misleading in
the same way as asserting that people in Shasta County choose to eat
chicken instead of dog. My point here is that the word "choose" is not
appropriate here because it fails to capture the structures that constrain the
act of choosing. If you want to know, say, why people eat chicken instead
of dog, you will need to investigate the structural, collective forces that
have kept dog off the menu, such as our Christian heritage, the role of
domesticated animals in English history, the role of animals in American
farming, and the like. Human behavior is messy, complex,
multidimensional, and resistant to formulae. It will not suffice to claim
that "people follow social norms in Shasta County because they choose to
do it." Such a claim is about as devoid of information as saying that
people rob banks because that is where the money is.
The methodological individualism favored by Ellickson goes back to
John Stuart Mill, who opined that "the laws and phenomena of society are,
and can be, nothing but the actions and passions of human beings" acting
99. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 283.
100. POSNER, supra note 45, at 8. Oddly, Posner defines self-interest to "include altruism and
other forms of interdependent utility." Id. This exercise in redefinition suggests an underlying inability
of rational choice theory to account for the full range of human emotions. Why not simply drop the
claim that people are always driven by self-interest and simply admit that people are sometimes
egotistical and sometimes altruistic--in other words, people are conflicted and complicated?
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pursuant to "laws of human nature." 101 Mill's individualism always brings
to mind Henri Bergson's reaction that "it takes centuries of culture to
produce a utilitarian like John Stuart Mill.' 0 2 In other words, only persons
of education, wealth, information, freedom, and privilege could come up
with a concept of human nature as involving unfettered choices about how
to live the good life. Given that structure is just as important as agency, it
is a shame that Ellickson and the New Chicago School cast aside the
critical insights of the entire sociological tradition from Marx to Bourdieu,
who look beneath the "rational actor" to discern the hidden structures that
shape and constrain agency.'
0 3
"Rationality" for Ellickson and the New Chicago School is understood
solely with respect to the parochial interests of a lone individual (there is
no discussion of what a rational society would look like), 104 and
furthermore, rationality is narrowly defined as the capacity to make
instrumental decisions about the means to achieve one's preferences. To
be sure, this is one variation of rationality, but it is not the whole story.
Theorists in the critical tradition have long stressed the overriding place of
substantive and value-laden rationality--the ability to establish ends
through discourse about ethics, politics, and justice. A person can be
rational in the narrow sense of logically pursuing their own interest, yet
simultaneously irrational in the larger sense of participating in an unjust
society. A slave-trader in the Old South might have been rational in the
narrow sense that Ellickson uses the term, but he is most assuredly
irrational in the broader sense of furthering an unjust system of
oppression. Social theorists have long pointed out the dangers in narrowly
defining reason. This is what Max Weber had in mind early in the
twentieth century when he warned that capitalism placed such a premium
on instrumental (narrow) rationality that people were beginning to suffer a
condition of "disenchantment." Similarly, critical theorists Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno warned that the Enlightenment gave rise
to a technological rationality that threatened to become an end in itself and
eclipse the use of critical reason. More recently, Jirgen Habermas warned
about "colonization of the lifeworld" caused by the application of
101. J.S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC ii, 469 (9th ed. 1875), quoted in LUKES, supra note 11, at
177-79. Over a century later, Margaret Thatcher would say the same thing: "[T]here is no such thing
as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families." MARGARET THATCHER, THE
DOWNING STREET YEARS 626 (1993).
102. HENRI BERGSON, THE Two SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 111 (R.A. Audra & C.
Brereton trans., 1935) (emphasis added).
103. The basic writings of these thinkers can be found in any general introduction to social
theory, such as CHARLES LEMERT, SOCIAL THEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS
(1998) (containing selections from Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Foucault, Habermas, and Bourdieu);
CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (Chris Calhoun et al. eds., 2002) (containing selections from
Foucault, Habermas, and Bourdieu, and discussing the legacy of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber).
104. Critical theory tackles the larger question of societal rationality. See JORGEN HABERMAS,
TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY (1972); MARCUSE, supra note 98, at 227 ("Critical thought strives to
define the irrational character of the established rationality.").
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technological and managerial thinking to all other spheres of life.' °5 Any
critical theorist who is well-versed in these formative thinkers can only
shake his head at the New Chicago School's constant invocations of
rationality and welfare-maximization as sufficient explanatory and
predictive tools when applied to a country riddled with poverty, which
imprisons more people than any other industrial nation, where tens of
millions of people lack basic health insurance, where a minuscule percent
of the population owns a majority of the wealth, where a reported one in
four women has been assaulted, where high school students live in fear of
violence, and where the minimum wage cannot support a family at the
poverty level. In the face of the many deeply contentious and seemingly
intractable problems that riddle contemporary society, are we really in a
position to build a theoretical model based on the assumption that people
behave rationally.
When faced with evidence of the overwhelming irrationality and
injustice of the current arrangement, the scholars associated with the New
Chicago School tend to circle the wagons by restricting their vision to
intra-group operations. Their standard response to the mention of social
evils is to insist that social norms only maximize welfare within a social
group, and that when it comes to dealings with outsiders (or among two
competing social groups) there is a breakdown in social norms. Consider
Ellickson's view of the social norms of racial prejudice among white
people during the 1960s:
All of the norms scholars, even the optimists, agree that a closely knit
group may generate a norm that injures outsiders more than it helps
insiders. McAdams's analysis of Southern traditions of racial
segregation, for example, indicates how the norms that Southern
whites developed to enhance their own status had horrific effects on
blacks. A legislature therefore may be wise to enact a statute, such as
a Civil Rights Act, that attends to the external costs that a parochial
norm has been inflicting.' 
06
This represents a giant concession that cuts out the very heart of the
movement. If social norms maximize the objective welfare only within a
group, then the movement is rendered silent about issues such as abortion,
affirmative action, school vouchers, corporate reform, environmental
legislation, international treaties, socialized health care, reparations, and
other burning issues where social groups are divided. So in the end we
have a theory that is silent on society's most pressing legal issues, which
is tantamount to affirming the status quo. To be sure, Ellickson deserves
credit for aspiring to pass beyond the threadbare rational-actor model of
105. MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 139 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans.,
1946); MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 5 (1972); 2 JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 356 (1987).
106. Ellickson, Evolution of Social Norms, supra note 10, at 41.
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classical law and economics, and this is why he insists on taking account
of "culture" and "human frailty.""1 7 But Ellickson insists on seeing culture
as the product of rational agreements among individuals, so we return in
short order to the rational actor model that haunts classical law and
economics.' °8 Despite the protestations about the importance of culture,
Ellickson's understanding of culture simply does not extend to the cultural
forces of gender, race, class, or history.
The classical economic model that dominates Ellickson's thinking is
inherently conservative because it sees society as a sort of pre-legal utopia
of rational actors who are inherently disposed to watch out for their own
interests. Given that such people can look out for themselves (they do this
almost by definition, one might say), there is no place for law in this
framework other than as externally imposed meddling by self-interested
outsiders. On the few occasions where Ellickson discusses whether courts
should intervene to override social norms, he generally favors a hands-off
approach. For instance, in Order Without Law Ellickson suggests that the
Uniform Commercial Code properly allows intra-group social norms (say,
industry custom among merchants) to be incorporated into commercial
contracts, and he opines that imposing a warranty of habitability to protect
tenants is not a good idea because it will not have any effect on the
mutually beneficial standoff between landlords and tenants.0 9
107. Robert Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989).
108. This point was captured wonderfully by the editors of a recent symposium in this Journal:
Indeed, some have argued that law and economics must take cultural effects into account. The
success of these methods, their ability to provide compelling accounts of particular legal
problems or solutions, is endangered by the implausibility of the original picture of the
individual as a rational actor. As they seek to provide a more robust framework, these
disciplines necessarily take on features of cultural analysis. Ironically, once methods based on
economics and rational choice accept the challenge of accommodating cultural influences in
their models, they lose most of the advantages of parsimony and objectivity that seemed to
separate them from the softer research tradition.
Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and
the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 7 n.23 (2001).
109. I find the latter assertion to be particularly problematic, especially because Ellickson reaches
this conclusion on the basis of a market model between landlords and tenants, as if they are equally
powerful. See ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 277 (arguing against rent control and the warranty of
habitability). But landlords and tenants are not equal parties with offsetting powers to exert
concessions from each other. In reality, landlords have the upper hand. It is precisely for this reason
that cities such as Chicago have enacted municipal ordinances that require landlords to return security
deposits and to respond promptly to tenant complaints. This was necessary because landlords were
refusing to release security deposits and refusing to make needed repairs. See Chicago Residential
Landlord-Tenant Ordinance, Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code §§ 5-12-010 (1986); see also Lawrence v.
Regent Realty Group, 754 N.E. 2d 334, 339 (Ill. 2001) ("A study cited by plaintiffs and presented to
the court showed that failure to pay interest on security deposits is a pervasive problem in the City of
Chicago."). In Chicago, most medium to upscale apartment buildings insisted that tenants sign a
standard form lease that was drafted by a consortium of property owners, and which gave no
meaningful rights to tenants. In other words, there was a market failure that had to be remedied by
law, not by social norms. The same goes for consumer protection laws, minimum wage laws,
securities laws, and so forth-each of which are areas where social norms proved harmful to weaker
parties and had to be fixed with law.
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In any event, there is little reason to accept the modest claim that social
norms are welfare-maximizing even within a given homogeneous group.
You may recall Shirley Jackson's famous short story The Lottery , in
which the citizens of a small town ritually kill a random citizen as part of
their annual harvest festival,11° or the more recent true story adapted into
the film Bully, in which a group of Florida teenagers ritually abuse each
other to the point of death.I"l These cultures, at least, had social norms that
were not welfare-maximizing. History is replete with endless examples of
intra-group social norms that were irrational and welfare-destroying, from
witch-burnings in close-knit Massachusetts towns to the ongoing practice
of "female circumcision" in certain cultures. The sweeping claim about
social norms being welfare-maximizing often boils down to the circular
claim that a particular social norm must be welfare-maximizing or else it
would not have been adopted by utility maximizers in the first place. But
even if it could be proved once and for all that a particular social norm
was utility-maximizing within a close-knit group, we can still ask, "So
what?" After all, even a welfare-maximizing social norm ought to be
overridden if it runs afoul of our commitment to justice and fairness.
CONCLUSION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE NEW CHICAGO SCHOOL
Those of us who are critical theorists feel a strange mixture of
admiration and disappointment when reading Order Without Law and the
work of the New Chicago School. Since we are distrustful of legal
formalism, we are excited to see a fresh commitment to fieldwork and an
attempt to move beyond the classical cookie-cutter doctrinal and policy
analysis found in most law review articles. On the other hand, we are
disappointed that the ethnographic material emerging from the fieldwork
is shaped, and then analyzed, by market-based models that stress
rationality, game playing, and other acontextual and ahistorical methods.
Ellickson's work on Shasta County was responsible for pointing legal
studies in a new direction, and for this he deserves tremendous credit and
praise. For all its faults, Order Without Law has earned respect as a classic
text of contemporary legal scholarship. But in a strange way, Ellickson's
book has proven almost too influential, in the sense that his models have
passed wholecloth (with limitations intact) to a new generation of
scholars, thereby multiplying and magnifying the shortcomings in the
original text. By relying on Ellickson's program, the members of the New
Chicago School package their work as sociology of a type,' but they only
110. SHIRLEY JACKSON, THE LOTTERY AND OTHER STORIES (1991).
111. BULLY (Lions Gate Films 2001).
112. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2478 (1997) (situating his work at the borders of law, economics, and sociology).
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skim the surface of that complicated discipline, avoiding the focal issues
that sociologists spend a lifetime researching, such as class, race, gender,
history, ideology, bureaucracy, and the role of power in the formation of
discourses and institutions. Without any grounding in the tradition of
critical theory and its call for a reflexive sociology where a theorist
recognizes her own biases, 13 the New Chicago School fails to see the
ideological component of its own models, often claiming political
agnosticism while tacitly espousing a laissez-faire market in social norms
that is oddly reminiscent of the laissez-faire worship of markets found in
the Old Chicago School of law and economics. Tellingly, Ellickson's
recent work postulates a "market in social norms," revealing the
hegemony of the economic model." 4 Perhaps this is why the so-called
New Chicago School has won the praise of Old Chicago School stalwarts
such as Richard Posner and Richard Epstein," 5 and why some members of
the New Chicago School have expressed a desire to subsume the
movement back within the Old Chicago School, which perhaps suggests
that the movements are not so different after all.16
The key ingredient missing in the body of scholarship running from
Coase to Ellickson to the New Chicago School is an appreciation for the
central role of interpretation in social theory. Like all positivists, they
want to create verifiable predictions, to pass beyond mere interpretations
to get at raw data, as if the "Facts of Shasta County" could be written
down once and for all on a set of 3 x 5 index cards." 7 Only in this way
will their work earn the mantle of "science," which is important to them.
So in order to generate verifiable predictions out of the messy business of
human interaction, they privilege simplified models of behavior that
bracket all idiosyncratic features of local customs. In Ellickson's case, we
are given a model that assumes that people are autonomous and rational
and willing to cooperate to increase their welfare, and then we are told that
the data show that social norms arise because people are autonomous and
rational and willing to cooperate to increase their welfare. The model has
113. See PIERRE BOURDIEU & Loic WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY
(1992).
114. Ellickson, Market for Social Norms, supra note 10, at 2.
115. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A
Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553 (1998). Posner also wrote a glowing review for the back cover of
the paperback version of Order Without Law. Epstein served as moderator for the panel discussion,
The New Chicago School: Myth or Reality?, sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School
Roundtable, where he applauded the school's libertarian slant. See Transcript, The New Chicago
School, supra note 5.
116. See Eric Posner, The Signaling Model of Social Norms: Further Thoughts, 36 U. RICH. L.
REv. 465, 465 (2002) (expressing hope for "the absorption of Law and Social Norms research into law
and economics"); see also Neil Duxbury, Signaling and Social Norms, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
719, 720 (2001) ("Ellickson's study ought to be regarded as an effort to refine rather than to challenge
the law and economics tradition .... Thus it is with social norms jurisprudence generally.").
1 17. The image comes from Donald N. McCloskey, Some Consequences of a Conjective
Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 69, 89.
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become reality.'18 We end up where we began, and we are no wiser about
the history of Shasta County or the way that local culture is shaped by
forces of ideology, religion, race, class, and gender.
The positivist demand for verification in the human sciences is
reactionary and unnecessary. Certainly, there are times when data is
helpful, such as when it is necessary to cite census figures or government
statistics. And one can imagine some instances where legal scholars put
forth hypotheses that are conceivably subject to verification, such as a
claim that a change in corporate law will induce businesses to incorporate
in a particular state, or that mandatory arbitration will reduce the number
of cases that go to trial. If all other factors can be held constant, then
perhaps these kinds of claims can be verified. But at best they merely
suggest a possible causal connection; they do not explain why the
connection exists, or whether it is desirable. When it comes to explaining
specific practices ("Why did the Colonists burn witches?," "Why did the
early Americans engage in duels?," "Why didn't Brown v. Board of
Education solve the problem of segregation?"), most contemporary
intellectuals now accept some variation on the notion that explanation
requires interpretation instead of prediction/verification, precisely because
human action is connected to social meanings and must be decoded and
"read" as one would read a text. This position was forcefully articulated
by philosopher Charles Taylor in his essay on the role of interpretation in
the social sciences:
If we have a science which has no brute data, which relies on
readings, then it cannot but move in a hermeneutical circle. A given
reading of the intersubjective meanings of a society, or of given
institutions or practices, may seem well founded, because it makes
sense of these practices or the development of that society. But the
conviction that it does make sense of this history itself is found on
further related readings .... [T]here is no verification procedure
which we can fall back on. We can only continue to offer
interpretations; we are in an interpretive circle) 9
Self-styled positivists such as Ellickson are afraid of the hermeneutic
circle because they fear that it leads to a free-for-all of multiple
interpretations, none of which can be vindicated as superior by
118. Critical theorist Theodor Adomo long ago pointed out the propensity for circular reasoning
in positivist social science: "The technique sets out to investigate an object with an instrument which,
through its own construction, decides in advance just what that object is: a simple case of circularity."
Theodor Adomo, Sociology and Empirical Research, in CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 237, 242 (Paul
Connerton ed., 1976).
119. Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL
INQUIRY, supra note 85, at 101, 126. Adomo makes the same point: "Empirical social research cannot
get around the fact that all the data it investigates, the subjective no less than the objective, are
mediated by society. The given, the facts which, according to its methodology, it encounters as its
ultimate, are not themselves ultimate but conditional." Adorno, supra note 118, at 255.
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verification. This is why Ellickson derisively repeats the canard that law
and society scholarship is an unscientific "swamp," 2 ' an intellectual
sewing circle where radicals, feminists, and ideologues cling blindly to
their perspectives and refuse to look at the "facts" and the "evidence" to
the same degree as Ellickson and his scientific colleagues. But it is a
mistake to believe that anyone (Ellickson included) can use science to
understand social norms (in Shasta County or elsewhere) without
becoming entangled in fuzzy interpretations and local knowledge. There is
no way to avoid the "swamp" because culture is a gigantic swamp, a
messy bricolage of history, class, race, economics, religion, biology,
ideology, and so forth. This is what makes it so fascinating--that it cannot
be reduced to a formula, only discussed in endless conversations from
various perspectives. For example, consider the social norm of
"neighborliness" that prevails among ranchers and farmers in Shasta
County. Scholar A might explain this norm as the result of a common
religion; Scholar B might stress the ethics of rural capitalism; Scholar C
might focus on the Western tradition, or on race, and so on. These
perspectives are all interpretations, and while they will each marshal a
certain number of facts in support, there is no way to verify one as better
than another. All we can do is say that a given interpretation does not
provide as robust (or as "rich" or "full") an account of the social norm
under discussion.
This answer is not acceptable to positivists such as Ellickson, who hope
to use the crucible of verification and science to show once and for all that
their theory is superior to the guesswork employed by fuzzy critical
theorists, feminists, and literary types. As Charles Taylor explains, this is
the unreachable goal of positivism: "[Positivism] is a genuine attempt to
go beyond the circle of our own interpretations, to get beyond subjectivity.
The attempt is to reconstruct knowledge in such a way that there is no
need to make final appeal to readings or judgments which cannot be
checked further."'' In other words, they want to get out of the business of
interpretation and get to the raw data, which might serve as a standard
against which to test various predictions. This insistence on verification is
somewhat odd coming from law professors, who would seem comfortable
with the idea of unverifiable multiple interpretations, since most of their
day is spent reading and debating the wisdom of appellate decisions that
contain majority and minority opinions-in other words, multiple
interpretations of the law. No law professor would speak of verifying
whether a majority opinion is correct, so it is odd to hear one insist on this
standard in the social sciences.
22
120. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 147.
121. Taylor, supra note 119, at 104.
122. Perhaps Morton Horwitz was premature in predicting that law and economics could no
longer cling to the pretense of "science": "After twenty years of attempting to claim that they stood
above ideology in their devotion to science, the practitioners of law and economics have finally been
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Social norms are important, which is why we need to adopt the most
fruitful methods for describing and evaluating them. Ellickson has pointed
legal scholarship in an important new direction by stressing the centrality
of social norms, and hopefully more critical theorists will jump into the
debate over social norms. Critical theory is particularly important to this
discussion because it offers a rich, imaginative framework for assessing
social norms: It is a self-reflexive approach that not only describes social
norms, but criticizes them, and it recognizes the role of race, class, gender,
and ideology. If more critical theorists enter the debates on social norms,
perhaps we can steer the dialogue closer to some of the seminal themes of
sociological theory instead of having the conversation dominated by law
and economics.
I do not mean to suggest that we should forever jettison game theory,
rational choice theory, and the related tools of economic analysis. These
will always have an important but limited-role to play in legal scholarship.
They are useful tools. Every time someone advocates a change in the law
to remedy a problem (e.g., new regulations on corporate disclosures, or
new standards for factory emissions) we should ask questions such as,
"How will rational, self-interested people react to the proposed law?,"
"Will the law create perverse incentives that make things worse?," and
"Will rational parties bargain around the law and thereby nullify its
intended effects?"
But when it comes to providing social explanations, these tools are too
slender a reed on which to build an account that captures the divisions,
antagonisms, contradictions, irrationalities, underlying structures, and
injustices of the existing system, and they cannot point the way toward
emancipation from oppressive social norms. 23 As Steven Lukes rightfully
insists, "No social theory merits serious attention that fails to retain an
ever-present sense of the dialectic of power and structure." '12 4 Ellickson
and the New Chicago School ignore the structural aspect of this dialectic
and instead place all of their emphasis on human agency and rationality.
This is why they tend to see social norms as consensually derived, and
why they generally criticize government regulation as an unwarranted
overriding of voluntary arrangements. Critical thinkers must reject this
approach by pointing out that social norms are often the product of
irrational and nonconsensual power relations that need to be overridden in
the interests of justice. One might say that our task is to look suspiciously
at the seeming "normalcy" of prevailing social norms.
forced to come out of the closet and debate ideology with the rest of us." Morton Horwitz, Law and
Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1981).
123. See Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1537, 1567
(2000) ("As valuable as the insights from economics and game theory are, they paint a somewhat
impoverished portrait of humans as social animals."); see also W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals:
Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 56
(2002) (criticizing the recent work on social norms done by the New Chicago School).
124. LUKES, supra note 11, at 29.
[Vol. 15:295
38
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol15/iss2/2
